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Estimating the panel gravity model with bilateral pair and country-by-time fixed-effects 
separately for each seafood product, we found that food safety regulations have differential 
effects across seafood products. In all three industrialized markets, shrimp is most sensitive, 
while fish is the least sensitive to changing food safety policies. The enforcement of the US 
HACCP, the EU Minimum Required Performance Level and the Japanese Food Safety Basic 
Law caused a loss of 90.45%, 99.47%, and 99.97% to shrimp trade in these markets, and a 
reduction associated with fish trade was 66.71%, 82.83%, and 89.32%.  
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Effects of Food Safety Standards on Seafood Exports to US, EU and Japan 
Introduction 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) provides member countries guidelines for regulations to 
protect human health, plants and animal life in importing countries. However, researchers are 
concerned that countries are increasingly using SPS measures as non-tariff barriers to trade, 
especially when tariffs and quantitative restrictions are reduced due to progressive trade 
liberalization (Henson and Loader, 2001).  
In global seafood trade, emerging food safety regulations have been imposed in 
industrialized markets, including the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) in the 
US (1997), minimum required performance limits (MRPLs) in the EU (2002), and the Food 
Safety Basic Law in Japan (2003). This paper explores imports into these three major markets.  
In particular, we try to understand how changes in food safety regulations in these markets 
affected seafood imports. We hypothesize that the imposition of the new regulations causes a 
loss of markets for exporting countries.  We also hypothesize that the regulations have 
differential effects on differentiated products. 
International Trade in Seafood and Policy Context  
World export of seafood increased during the period 1984-2004, and achieved a record 
value of US$ 71.5 billion in 2004 (FAO, 2007). On the one hand, the global expansion of trade 
in seafood highlights an important role of developing countries as major seafood exporters.  FAO 
(2007) reveals that 48 % of the value of fish and fishery products traded worldwide in 2004 came 
from developing countries. On the other hand, the top importers of seafood are developed 
countries in which the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US) are the largest 2 
 
import markets. During the period 2002-2004, the developed markets comprising of the EU, 
Japan and the United States accounted for 77% of the fishery exports from developing countries 
(FAO, 2007). In 2005, for example, Japan was the top seafood importing nation with $14.4 
billion of seafood value, followed by the US with an estimated imported value of $12.1 million 
(Johnson et al., 2007).  
In 2002, the EU implemented Commission Decision 2003/181/EC to set out Minimum 
Required Performance Limits (MRPLs) for residues of certain substances in foods of animal 
origin. These substances are those with no established Maximum Residue Limit (MRLs) and/or 
Acceptable Daily Intake (ADIs). MRPLs are specified minimum concentration levels of a 
detectable residue. The EU set the MRPL for poultry and aquaculture products for 
chloramphenicol at 0.3µg/kg and for nitrofuran metabolites at 1 µg/kg (EC, 2003).  In 2002, the 
Commission introduced regulations on the analytical technologies to detect residues (EC, 2002).   
As a result, the EU has been able to detect very low levels of residues in food, with sensitivity 
increasing ten-fold compared with the early 1990s (FAO/WHO, 2004).  
In Japan, a series of incidents relating to food occurred in the period 2000-2002, raising 
the consciousness of consumers over food safety. To respond to the increasing concerns of 
consumers, the Japanese government amended the Food Sanitation Law and passed the new 
Food Safety Basic Law, taking effect from summer 2003 (Japanese Government, the Cabinet 
Office, 2003).  The Food Safety Basic Law is based on a risk analysis, which aims to protect 
consumer health and safety. Under this law, the Food Safety Commission, an advisory 
committee constituted of scientific experts, was newly established. This Commission is required 
to evaluate toxicological residues in food stuff as a part of its risk assessment.  In addition, the 
revised Food Sanitation Law restricts substances without MRLs to zero tolerance and does not 3 
 
allow products with these substances to enter the Japanese market. This regulation is more 
stringent than what was required in the previous Food Sanitation Law, as the unrevised law did 
not prohibit residues of substances with no available MRLs (Miyagawa, 2004).  
In the US seafood industry, Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) became 
mandatory application from 18 December 1997 (Anders and Caswell, 2007). HACCP is a 
preventative system to control hazards in food products, with particular emphasis on the 
reduction of food-borne pathogens. It was a new approach to food safety, since it focuses on 
controlling production process instead of testing final products (Cato, 1998). According to the 
FDA, the purpose of HACCP adoption is to identify hazardous risks and reduce contaminations 
at the early stages of the production process. Under HACCP, seafood processing firms need to 
conduct a hazard analysis. Once firms establish critical control points for each hazard, firms are 
required to develop and implement a HACCP plan to prevent, or eliminate contaminations (GAO, 
2001).  
Literature review 
Food Safety Standards and International Trade 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to quantify the trade effects of emerging 
food safety standards. Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001), Wilson and Otuki (2003 and 2004) 
employed the gravity model to look at the effects of EU standards on agricultural exports. Their 
findings provide evidence that higher standards have negative and statistically significant effects 
on bilateral trade flows.  
In the case of seafood, fewer studies have measured trade effects of food safety 
regulations quantitatively. Cato and dos Santos (1998) examined the economic loss to 
Bangladesh shrimp industry when the European Commission banned seafood exports from 4 
 
Bangladesh in 1997 due to safety problems. Using secondary data analysis and a survey, the 
authors estimated that Bangladesh frozen shrimp processors experienced a loss in total revenue 
of $14.6 million (in 1997 dollars) as consequence of the ban. Debaere (2005) suggested that 
differences in technical barriers among countries can generate considerable diversion effects on 
shrimp trade. He provided evidence that the declaration of zero tolerance for antibiotics by the 
EU diverted shrimp exports of Thailand from the EU to the US.  The author argues that this shift 
caused the shrimp price to fall in the US market. Thus, strengthened food safety regulations in 
the EU market not only affect trade between the EU and Thailand, but also trade relationship 
between Thailand and the US.  
Recently, Anders and Caswell (2007) investigated the impact of the mandatory 
application of HACCP in the US on seafood exports from the top 33 countries. Estimating the 
gravity model with random effects, they found that HACCP adoption by the US reduced its 
import value of seafood from 0.13% to 0.35%.  
Our paper makes another effort to quantify the impacts of stricter technical barriers in the 
industrialized markets on the global seafood trade. However, our study differs from the others in 
the following ways: First, while previous studies examining trade effects of standards in a 
particular market, we investigate simultaneously three major markets, the EU, US and Japan. 
Second, unlike Anders and Caswell (2007) estimating effects of standards on aggregate seafood, 
our paper analyzes disaggregated data to assess the impacts on different types of seafood. This 
approach is motivated by our hypothesis that the stringency of food safety regulation may have 
differential effects on products. Finally, following Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) (2003) 
and Baier and Berstrand (B&B) (2007), which are described below, this paper employs the 
theoretically consistent gravity model, using panel data and country-by-time fixed-effects. This 5 
 
theory-motivated model was not estimated in Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh. (2001), Wilson and 
Otuki (2003 and 2004); and Anders and Caswell (2007).  
The Gravity Equation 
Applying the typical cross-section gravity equation to study trade effects of regulatory 
standards, we can specify the model as follows: 
(1)  ln               ln           ln      
     ln                                            
                                        
  
   
       
where Xij is seafood exports deflated in 2000 dollars from country i to country j. GDPit 
and GDPjt are real GDP of country i and country j in year t. DISTij is the distance between 
exporter i and importer j. CONTIGij is a dummy variable for shared borders, taking the value of 1 
if country i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise. COLONYij is a dummy variable, 
taking the value of 1 if two countries have a common colonial history and 0 otherwise. LANGij is 
a dummy variable for language, taking the value of 1 if country i and j speak a common language.  
NAFTAijt (EUijt) are dummy variables denoting memberships of country i and j in year t to the 
regional trade agreements, taking the value of 1 if both exporter i and importer j are members of 
the NAFTA (EU), and 0 otherwise. FOODSTNDnijt are dummy variables indicating food safety 
policies (n=US HACCP, EU MRPL, and Japan Law) imposed by country i on country j in year t.  
Despite a workhorse in empirical research, the gravity model specified in equation1 is not 
formally motivated by an economic theory (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; AvW, 2003, 
B&B (2007). Anderson (1979) is the first researcher who provided a theoretical economic basis 
to the equation.  He showed that trade between two countries depends on their bilateral barriers 6 
 
relative to the average trade barriers they face in trading with the rest of the world. However, 
traditional gravity models did not pay any attention to these relative barriers. Following 
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) pointed out that the traditional gravity equation is 
misspecified since it excluded price terms. Recently, AvW (2003) used the price indices to 
account for average trade barriers, and estimated the model by nonlinear least square method. 
AvW (2003) also suggested another alternative method for cross-sectional data set. That is to 
replace the multilateral price terms with country-specific dummy variables, i.e. using fixed-
effects by exporter i and importer j, restrict the GDP coefficients to unity, and estimate by 
ordinary least square method.  
Recently, B&B (2007) pointed out that the theoretically consistent model suggested by 
AvW (2003) still suffers from an endogeneity problem. This endogeneity comes from 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity between countries. Therefore, the authors expanded the 
previously developed framework to a panel setting to control for endogeneity. In addition, they 
argued that since in panel setting, the multilateral price terms, as noted in Bergstrand (1985), are 
time-varying, they are best adjusted for by using country-by-time fixed-effects. Finally, B&B 
(2007) scaled the dependent variable by the product of GDPs as suggested by the theory.  
In empirical studies, Grant and Lambert (2008) adapted B&B (2007) method to estimate 
treatment effects of membership in regional trade agreeents. However, the method suggested by 
B&B (2007) has not been used in analyzing the relationship between trade and regulatory 
standards. For example, Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) and Wilson and Otuski (2003 and 
2004) used fixed-effects model with importing countries. On the other hand, Anders and Caswell 
(2007) adapted random effect method. In this paper, we adopt the theory-motivated model 
developed by AvW (2003) and B&B (2007), with panel data and country-by-time fixed-effects 7 
 
for two reasons: i) to control for endogeneity of policy variables and ii) to account for time-
varying multiple price terms.  
Estimating Equations and Data 
In this paper, we will test two hypothesis: i) more stringent food safety regulations in the 
EU, Japan and US markets have negative effects on world exports of seafood; and ii) emerging 
standards have differential effects on different categories of seafood. To test the first hypothesis, 
we estimate the following gravity equations:  
Model 1: Typical gravity equation with no time and country pair fixed-effects 
(2.1)  ln               ln           ln      
     ln                                            
                                                  
                       
Model 2: Time fixed-effects  
(2.2)  ln              
     ln           ln      
     ln                                            
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Model 3: Time and bilateral pair fixed-effects 
(2.3)  ln                    
     ln           ln      
     ln                                            
                                                  
                       
Model 4: Theory-consistent model with bilateral pair and country-by-time fixed-effects 
(2.4) 
ln
    
               
                                             
                                                 
where USHACCPijt, which is a dummy variable representing the US imposition of HACCP on 
seafood, equals 1 for trade beginning 1997 and 0, otherwise. EUMRPLijt, which is a dummy 
variable representing the EU implementation of MPRPs, equals 1 for trade beginning 2002 and 
0 otherwise. JPLAWijt, which is a dummy variable representing the amendment and new laws for 
food safety in Japan, equals 1 for trade beginning 2004 and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
previously defined in equation (1). To test the second hypothesis, we regress separately equation 
(2.4) on data for shrimp, fish, and mollusk.  
Trade data are from UNCOMTRADE data base for three products, shrimp (code 03611) 
fish (code 034 and 035) and mollusks (code 0363) in the period 1990-2005. The data include 123 
exporting countries and 17 importing countries (Japan, US and EU 15). The 15 European 
countries covered in the study are those that were EU members in 2000, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. GDP data are from the World 9 
 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006). Information on distance, contiguity and common 
language are from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
After excluding the zero trade values and missing records, the total number of observations used 
for the study is 33,791. 
Bilateral real export value (the 2000 price) of each seafood commodity (shrimp, fish, and 
mollusks) is on average $10.45 million per year when all three seafood products are pooled 
together (See Table 1). Standard deviation is about 4.6 times larger than the mean of real seafood 
trade value.  By commodity, the means of shrimp and fish trade values are close to each other 
about $12.42 million for shrimp and $11.58 million for fish.  The mean value of mollusks trade 
is about $5.69 million. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the estimated results for four model specifications with pool panel data. 
Model 1 with no time or country fixed-effects and Model 2 with time fixed-effects produce 
similar results. Typical gravity variables such as GDPs, distance, continuity, and colonial ties, 
are statistically significant. The signs and magnitudes of these variables are similar to those in 
the traditional gravity literature. Also, two variables presenting regional trade agreements, 
NAFTA and EU, are statistically significant and have positive effects on bilateral trade flow of 
seafood. However, while the distance variable has an expected sign, its magnitude is much 
smaller (10-20 times) than that commonly found in the gravity model. The dummy variable 
standing for common language is also statistically significant but has a negative sign.  
Considering three key variables indicating average effects of seafood safety policies in 
the Model 1 and 2, USHACCP and EUMRPL are statistically significant and have hypothesized 
sign. The dummy variable capturing the Japanese law, JPLAW, has an unexpected sign, but 10 
 
statistically insignificant. These two models have lower predictive power than that frequently 
found in the literature—the R
2 is only 0.138 and 0.139.  
Consistent with theoretical and empirical findings of other papers e. g., B&B (2007) and 
Grant and Lambert (2008), the similar results in Model 1 and Model 2 suggest that the time 
fixed-effects model does not correct the endogeneity problems of the first model. This outcome 
is understandable, given that the panel data set only covers a short time period (1990-2005), 
relative to the large involvement of bilateral country pairs (124 exporting and 17 importing 
countries). Therefore, the heterogeneity between country pairs has not been fixed. Estimates of 
coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2 are, therefore, not reliable. 
For comparison, we estimated the model with time and country pairs fixed-effects 
(Model 3). The results indicate instability of regression coefficients compared with the Model 1 
and Model 2. For example, NAFTA and EUMPRL variables are no longer statistically significant. 
The sign of both EUMPRL and JPLAW have changed compared with the first two models. The 
magnitude of USHACCP variables is 4-5 times smaller in the absolute term, relative to Model 1 
and 2. Although the R
2 has improved from 0.138 and 0.139 in Model 1 and 2 to 0.49 in Model 3, 
Model 3 with time and bilateral pair fixed-effects is still not an appropriate one. The reason is 
that, like Model 1 and 2, Model 3 is not consistent with the theory because it still has an 
endogeneity problem due to the omitted multiple price terms.  
Accounting for this problem, AvW (2003) B&B (2007) suggested a theoretically 
consistent model with country-by-time fixed-effects, imposing a unity restriction of GDP 
coefficients. We estimated this model and present the results in Column 4 of Table 2. These 
results differ substantially from the three previously estimated models in a number of important 
ways. 11 
 
First, the EU dummy variable is still significant, whereas the NAFTA variable is no 
longer significant, a result not uncommon in the literature. Second, all the seafood safety dummy 
variables included in Model 4 are statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis that more 
stringent food safety regulations in the EU, Japan, and US markets have negative effects on 
international trade of seafood products. Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), we can 
calculate the partial elasticities of stricter technical barriers in percentage and level value at the 
mean. For example, results in Model 4 show that the imposition of HACCP by the US generated 
a      .     1     100   70.48% average annual reduction, or $7.4 million, of potential export 
value of seafood products over the period of HACCP imposition. Seafood exporters to EU 
experienced a loss of 88.6% ($9.2 million) of export value, while seafood exporters to Japan 
faced a decrease of 97% (or $10.2 million) of potential export value (see Column 1 of Table 4). 
From this analysis, the amendment of Food Sanitation Law and enactment of Food Safety Basic 
Law in Japan (2003) had a stronger effect on imports, suggesting a greater cost associated with 
these regulations. The US HACCP regulations while, it lowered imports, may have improved 
efficiency for some exports. 
Effects of Higher Standards on Different Products 
Differences in technical standards imposed on various commodities suggest that food 
safety regulations may have different effects across traded seafood products. This idea is 
supported by our results of the Chow test for separated regressions of the shrimp, fish and 
mollusks. Therefore, we estimate the country pair and country-by-time fixed-effects model 
(Model 4) separately for each product. The results in Table 3 show that shrimp imports to 
industrialized markets (the EU, US and Japan) are the most sensitive to tighter levels of food 
safety control. This finding is consistently observed in the three investigated markets (Column 1 12 
 
of Table 3). Fish is less sensitive than shrimp (indicated by smaller magnitude of food safety 
regulation coefficients in Table 3). Mollusks is also sensitive to emerging standards in the EU 
and Japan markets, but its imports into the US is not statistically impacted by the US HACCP 
mandatory application over the study period.  
Partial elasticities of food safety regulations and RTA variables based on estimates 
presented in Table 3 are derived and presented in Table 4. On average, mandatory application of 
the US HACCP over the study period resulted in 90% ($11.2 million) and 66.7% ($7.7 million) 
reduction in potential shrimp and fish export value annually. The introduction of MRPL in the 
EU over the study period led to a decline of 99.5% ($12.3 million), 82.8% ($9.6 million), and 
92.1% ($5.2 million) for shrimp, fish, and mollusks. The enforcement of the Japanese laws 
caused a loss of 98.61% ($12.4 million) and 99.97% ($5.7 million) of potential import value of 
shrimp and mollusks; and about 89% ($10.3 million) of loss in potential fish import value.  
Conclusion 
This paper examines the impacts of increased food safety standards in the EU, US, and 
Japan on world’s seafood export performance to these markets. Effects of seafood safety policies 
such as the US implementation of HACCP in 1997, the EU introduction of MRPL in 2002, and 
enactment of the Food Safety Basic Law in Japan in 2003 are captured by the dummy variables. 
The paper uses panel data in a gravity model with bilateral pair and country-by-time fixed-effects 
developed by AvW (2003) and B&B (2007) to control for endogeneity and time-varying 
multiple price terms. For comparison purposes, the paper also estimates other gravity model 
specifications for a panel data (the model with no time and country pair fixed-effects, the model 
with time fixed-effects, and the model with time and country pair fixed-effects). 13 
 
Estimating the panel gravity model with bilateral pair and country-by-time fixed-effects 
separately for each seafood product, we found that food safety regulations have differential 
effects across seafood products. In all three industrialized markets, shrimp is most sensitive, 
while fish is the least sensitive to changing food safety policies. The enforcement of the US 
HACCP, the EU MRPL and the Japanese Food Safety Basic Law caused a respective loss of 
90.45%, 99.47%, and 99.97% to shrimp trade in these markets, and a reduction associated with 
fish trade was 66.71%, 82.83%, and 89.32%.  
Our findings are consistent with those of previous studies in that addressing endogeneity 
of trade policy variables is important to obtain their unbiased estimates. As the results suggest, 
failing to address the endogeneity of policy variables will lead to underestimating the impacts of 
policy variables on trade. 
From a cursory review of the data, more products come from the least developed 
countries for shrimp relative to mollusks. In further research, we will analyze the differential 
effects of these policies on less developed countries. In addition, our findings suggest that future 
studies should investigate the adjustment of countries overtime to overcome higher food safety 
regulations.  For example, US HACCP had the smallest effect on exports relative to the other 
policies.  Is this because HACCP created greater efficiencies in production processes, as asserted 
earlier, or has the greater age of the policy allowed more producers to adjust?  Future research 
will address these questions.14 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N  Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
X ($)  33,791 10,448,023  48,104,235  1  1,808,005,245 
Xshrimp ($)  7,010 12,417,404  50,696,974  1  793,980,929 
Xfish ($)  19,291 11,580,441  53,913,035  1  1,808,005,245 
Xmollusks ($)  7,490 5,688,234  48,104,235  1  332,616,256 
GDPimporter ($1000)  33,791 1,847,160,979  2,701,506,025  18,700,012  11,000,039,724 
GDPexporter ($1000)  33,791 542,426,518  1,426,094,899  30,436  11,000,039,724 
Distance (km)  33,791 5,725  4,534  60  19,586 
NAFTA  33,791 0.00  0.06  0  1 
EU  33,791 0.24  0.43  0  1 
CONTIG  33,791 0.07  0.25  0  1 
LANG  33,791 0.12  0.33  0  1 
COLONY  33,791 0.09  0.28  0  1 
EUMRPL  33,791 0.26  0.44  0  1 
JPlaw  33,791 0.01  0.11  0  1 
USHACCP  33,791 0.06  0.23  0  1 
Note: All price data are in deflated with 2000 as base year. X represents the export value. 15 
 
Table 2: Gravity Model Specifications of Seafood Trade  
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Constant  -12.740*** -12.604***  13.933***  9.508*** 
 (-28.86)  (-26.76)  (-3.03)  (46.27) 
lnGDPit 0.655***  0.658***  0.727***  1.00
+
 
 (51.49)  (51.3)  (4.49)   
lnGDPjt 0.310***  0.309***  0.220***  1.00
+ 
 (36.62)  (36.43)  (6.06)   
lnDISTij -0.046**  -0.047)**     
 (-2.11)  (-2.17)     
CONTIGij  0.954*** 0.951***     
 (12.96)  (12.92)    
COLONYij  0.770*** 0.769***     
 (11.19)  (11.2)   
LANGij  -0.401*** -0.396***     
 (-6.54)  (-6.47)     
NAFTAijt  2.831*** 2.848***  0.163  -0.944 
 (14.07)  (14.18)  (0.28)  (-1.24) 
EUijt  0.775*** 0.770***  1.023***  1.653*** 
 (14.82)  (14.71)  (10.16)  (10.07) 
EUMRPLijt  -0.259*** -0.300**  0.115  -2.168*** 
 (-6.89)  (-2.52)  (1.18)  (-3.26) 
JPLAWijt  0.019 0.063  -0.379**  -3.617*** 
 (0.11)  (0.29)  (-2.23)  (-5.11) 
USHACCPijt  -0.941*** -1.004***  -0.229**  -1.220*** 
 (-10.97)  (-9.9)  (-2.17)  (-2.94) 
R
2   0.138  0.139  0.489  0.733 
F  statistics  562.5  239.58 - - 
N 33,791  33,791  33,791  33,791 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  We used White’s heteroskedastic correction method to produce 
the standard errors.  The symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
+Indicates values imposed by model construction (B&B ) 16 
 
Table 3: Estimation with Bilateral Pairs and Country-by-Time Fixed-effects by Seafood 
Commodity 
Variable Shrimp  Fish  Mollusks 
Constant  9.012*** 9.721***  9.107*** 
 (12.71)  (31.64)  (30.27) 
NAFTAijt  1.004 -0.671  -2.409*** 
 (0.87)  (-0.63)  (-3.94) 
EUijt  1.732*** 1.988***  1.662*** 
 (5.01)  (9.36)  (6.04) 
EUMRPLijt  -5.237*** -1.762***  -2.541** 
 (-3.3)  (-2.25)  (-2.16) 
JPlawijt  -8.221*** -2.237***  -4.277*** 
 (-8.57)  (-2.69)  (-3.54) 
USHACCPijt  -2.349** -1.100**  -0.879 
 (-2.53)  (-2.09)  (-1.21) 
R
2   0.920  0.810  0.935 
N 7,010  19,291  7,490 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  We used White’s heteroskedastic correction method to produce 
the standard errors.  The symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 17 
 
Table 4: Elasticities of Food Safety Standards and RTAs on Real Export Values by Commodity 
   Seafood Commodities 
Variable Pooled  Shrimp  Fish  Mollusks 
NAFTA  - -  -  -91.01** 
       (-5.18) 
EU  422.26*** 465.19***  630.09*** 426.98*** 
  (44.13) (57.78)  (72.96) (24.30) 
EUMRPL  -88.56*** -99.47***  -82.83*** -92.12*** 
  (-9.25) (-12.35)  (-9.59)  (-5.24) 
JPLAW  -97.31*** -99.97***  -89.32*** -98.61*** 
  (-10.17) (-12.42)  (-10.34)  (-5.69) 
USHACCP  -70.48*** -90.45**  -66.71**  - 
 (-7.37)  (-11.23)  (-7.73)   
Notes: The numbers in parentheses reflect the change in real export value ($million) after the imposition of the food 
safety regulation.  The symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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